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Abstract: This paper provides a rationale for taxing waste exports when clo-
sure risks are endogenous in that they depend on the importing
country's accumulated stock of waste. The paper shows that the
optimal time path of waste exports requires a progressively
increasing tax rate which even surmounts a Hotelling tax which
tackles the problem by evaluating the expected closure stock.
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During the last years, the export of solid and hazardous waste has become
one of the most controversial issues of environmental policy in industrial
countries (see, e.g., HlLZ, 1992). The debate is largely polarized between
two extreme viewpoints. On the one hand, extreme environmentalists call
for a total ban on waste exports which they consider as a kind of neocoloni-
alism that shifts environmental problems into politically weak (developing)
countries. On the other hand, extremely market-oriented economists claim
that there should be no governmental interferences at all since transfrontier
movements of waste are nothing else than an expression of comparative
cost advantages the exploitation of which is beneficial for all involved
countries.
1
Both conclusions are wrong. Even from a paternalistic point of view that
includes long-term welfare effects in the importing country, a total ban on
waste exports can not be justified since there exist many cases where
international trade in waste management services does not conflict with
considerations like equity and sustainability. However, a similar objection
can be raised against the call for an unlimited laissez-faire regime since
there exist circumstances under which regulations of waste exports can be
justified by purely domestic interests. For example, improper disposal prac-
tices by the importing country may cause transfrontier environmental exter-
nalities that diminish the quality of groundwater in the exporting country.
Another, less obvious case which justifies regulations of waste exports
from a purely domestic point of view is connected with closure risks, i.e.
the risk that the possibility of waste export may be foreclosed by an
unilateral action of the importing country.
2 One could assume that these
risks are exogenous with respect the exporting countries' decisions. In this
case, the problem of identifying an optimal policy regarding waste exports
can be solved by a myopic optimization approach (see Section 2).
However, the foreclosure option is usually caused by public resistance in
1 For an ironically exaggerated presentation of this viewpoint see SUMMERS (1992).
The practical significance of such risks has become particularly clear in the end
of 1992 when France and some countries in Eastern Europe announced that they
will close their borders for foreign (especially German) waste.the importing country, and it seems plausible to.assume that the degree of
resistance is influenced by the accumulated stock of imported waste.
Hence, from the perspective of the exporting country, the closure risk is not
exogenous but depends on the chosen export policy.
It is this latter case we will analyze in the present paper. In particular, we
will show that an optimal time path of waste exports requires the imple-
mentation of a dynamic export tax which even surmounts the
corresponding Hotelling tax. In Section 2, we introduce our model and
determine the (myopic) laissez-faire level of waste exports. In Section 3,
we contrast this solution with the optimal time path and discuss the
properties of an optimal tax scheme on waste exports. In Section 4, we
close the paper by some concluding remarks.
2. The Model
We assume that the economy produces a constant flow of waste W°. Waste
management includes two options: Domestic treatment by recycling, incin-
eration or landfill and exports into another country. Due to institutional
deficiencies, the importing country charges a constant per unit price of q
and does not take into account that its landfill capacities may be limited.
3
The accumulated stock of waste exports is denoted by S and the probability
of closure is given by the probability function P(S) with P(0)=0 and the
corresponding density function p(S). Hence, the closure risk solely depends
on the policy of the export country.
Domestic treatment exhibits increasing marginal costs caused by tight en-
vironmental regulations. For the sake of simplicity, we assume a quadratic
cost function where S', the first derivative of the stock S with respect to
time, indicates waste exports:
4
This assumptions seems pretty reasonable from an empirical point of view since
even in the FRG and most other OECD-countries public landfill rates usually do
not include depletion costs (see MICHAELIS, 1992).
Domestic treatment may also include source reduction. In this case, W° has to be
interpreted as the potential flow that would be produced under the assumption of
free disposal.(1) Cd = 1 (W - S')2, Y > 0.
A myopic planner or a sufficient number of individual waste producers do
not take the risk-increasing effects of waste exports into account. The waste
producers may even know that their exports increase the closure risk. But
any individual denial on waste exports merely produced strong positive
externalities for the other potential exporters whereas the individual bene-
fits of a reduction of the global closure risk fell extremely short of the cor-
responding individual costs. Thus, a myopic planner or a sufficient number
of unregulated individual waste producers behave as if the closure risk
were absent and just balance marginal domestic treatment cost with the
export price q. This results in a myopic time path where waste exports
S'm(t) are constant over time until the importing country closes its borders:
(2) S'm(t) = W° - - = const.
Y
This solution, however, cannot be optimal since it does not take into
account that the closure risks depend on waste exports.
3. Optimizing Waste Exports
We assume that the social planner is risk-neutral and minimizes the expect-
ed costs of waste treatment. This assumption is not arbitrary but originates
from the magnitude of risky decisions which governmental authorities face.
Unless the authorities recognize strong effects on the risks of other decision
problems, i.e. unless risk of waste export policies and other policies are
strongly correlated, the assumption of basing waste policies on expected
costs is well-founded because the great number of other risky decisions
provides an insurance with respect to the total risks of a country's policy
(see ARROW/LIND, 1970). Additionally, we assume that the planner
discounts future costs and benefits by a constant non-zero discount rate r.
Since domestic waste treatment does not stand at risk, we can adopt the
dual problem of maximizing the expected profits of waste exports. Thus,the socially optimal time path of waste exports is given by the solution of
the following maximization problem:
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- S'(t))2 - qS'(t) dt s.t. S(0) = 0.
0




which can be rearranged for:
q S"(t) p(S(t))
(4) S'(t) = W°- - + - S'(t)
2.
Y r 2r [1 - P(S(t))]
Unfortunately, (4) does not generally fulfil the second-order-conditions





is only negative if dp/dS is negative.
6 This requirement is a too strong con-
dition because it rules all well-known density functions out because they
exhibit a descending branch like, e.g., the normal distribution. However,
the second derivative of the integrand with respect to waste exports, i.e.
Fs,s, = e-rt[l-P(S(t))lY < 0,
is clearly non-positive and ensures that (4) meets the Legendre condition
for local concavity (see, e.g., CHIANG, 1992). Hence, (4) turns out to repre-
-* Note that in the case of exogenous closure risks the maximization problem would
lead to the myopic solution described by (2) since any denial on waste exports
would not change risks.
A negative dp/dS is only a necessary condition which is not sufficient to
guarantee the concavity condition of an always positive Fg.g. Fgg - Fg.g
2.sent at least a locally optimal plan. In the Appendix, we proof that the
myopic path, which is conceivably the only competing candidate for an
optimal export policy, does not represent a local optimum since any margi-
nal export restriction shows up to improve on the myopic outcome. Hence,
the time path according to (4) is the only local optimum and consequently
the global one, too.
However, the differential equation (4) is not very convenient since the term
which contains p(S(t)) prevents to solve it explicitly. This term signals that
waste exports do not merely increase a principally limited stock. Addi-
tionally, waste exports deteriorate the risks of the existence of waste export
opportunities. In terms of the famous problem of 'eating a cake of unknown
size' (see KEMP/LONG, 1980), eating a piece of the cake does not only
imply a smaller cake but also an increased risk that- the cake will be stolen.
Although we cannot solve (4) explicitly, it is evident that waste exports will
decline in the course of time. Discussing the path properties demands to
address the transversality conditions concerning the end of the planning
horizon. A risk-neutral planner will determine the end of the planning
horizon, T, in terms of the expected closure stock Q which is given by
00
Q s /Sp(S)ds = S(T).
o
The planner expects that the importing country will close its borders when
the accumulated stock of waste exports has reached the closure stock Q. A
free T and a fixed closure stock induce the transversality condition that all
expected export opportunities should be exploited at time T. This can only
be satisfied by the condition S'(T) •= 0. Hence, the optimal time path of
waste exports approaches zero when the expected endogenous closure date
is reached.
Now suppose a "naive" planner which falsely assumes that he can catch the
risks of waste export solely by fixing the expected closure stock. Such a
planner would calculate Q and chose a time path of waste exports which
seems to exploit a limited resource efficiently. This "naive Hotelling-
approach" simplifies (4) significantly into:(4




1) represents a solvable second-order inhomogenous difference equation
which has the following solution:
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(5) S(t) = [1 - e
rt] [W° - - ] — + [W° - - ] t.
Y r Y
Differentiating (5) with respect to t provides the time path of waste exports,
S'(t), and its curvature:
(6a) S'(t) = [W° - - ] [1 - e^-T)] > 0,
Y
(6b) S"(t) = -re^-T^W
0- -] < 0,
Y





Comparing the myopic path (2) with (6a) reveals that the naive Hotelling
path implies lower waste exports at every moment of time. Moreover, as
can be seen from (6b) and (6c), the time path of exports exhibits negative
first and second- derivatives with respect to time. According to this solution,
the Hotelling tax on waste exports, a(t), must increase overproportionally
in the course of time:
(7) a(t) = e"
r(t-T) {yW° - q}.
However, assuming a problem according to (4
!) means neglecting that
waste exports deteriorate the risks of future waste export opportunities. The
social planner would stick to a too optimistic waste export path, i.e. he
would be highly endangered to experience an earlier closure date although
his expectations concerning the closure stock were true from an ex ante
perspective. Comparing (4') and (4) reveals that the optimal path must lie
Note that [1 - e
rt] is unambiguously negative.below the naive Hotelling path, and consequently a tax according to a(t)
would fall short of the necessary tax. Hence, a tax which guarantees the ef-
ficient use of foreign waste disposal opportunities must even surmount the
Hotelling-based tax.
The tax scheme (7) is clearly a progressive tax because the naive Hotelling
path implies overproportionally decreasing waste exports. The optimal tax
is also a progressive one. Rearranging (4) and differentiation with respect
to time yields:
(8) S'"(t) = S"(t) P(S)
r+ S'(t)
1 - P(S)
(8) shows that the second derivative of waste exports exhibits the same sign
as the first derivative which means that the optimal time path of waste ex-
ports is declining and concave, too. E.g. assuming the specific probability
function P(S) = 1 - e~
nS, which provides a constant [p(S)/(l-P(S))] =n, leads
to:
S"'(t) = S"(t)[r + 7tS'(t)].
4. Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that a rationale for taxing waste exports exists
when closure risks are endogenous in that they depend on the accumulated
stock of waste in the importing country. It turned out that the optimal time
path of waste exports requires a progressively increasing tax rate which
even surmounts the Hotelling tax which tackles the problem by a mere eva-
luation of the expected closure stock. Hence, unless institutional defi-
ciencies can be ruled out, our results indicate that managing waste exports
is a much more complex issue than merely relying on the short-sighted ex-
ploitation of cheap export opportunities.Appendix
Assume that the waste exporting country sticks to the myopic path but deviates from it
for a specific period [x, x + Ax], 0 < x, x + Ax < T, through decreasing waste exports by








t [1 - P({W° - q/y}x + {W° - (q/y) - e}t)] [(y/2)W°
2 . (Y/2){q/y + e}
2 -
x
q{W° -(q/Y) - e}] dt
T'
- P({W' - (q/Y)}x + {W -(q/Y) - e}t] [- Y{q/y + e} + q]}
e-
r




Compared to the myopic path, V represents the changed discounted expected profits
and the changed terminal date T, dT'/de, is due to a denial on export opportunities which
delay the expected closure decision of the other country. According to the Leibnitz
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shows that the myopic path is no local maximum because marginally restricting the
waste exports for a certain period can easily increase the expected profits. Because (4)
represents the only extremal interior value and restricting the myopic path improves the
outcome, (4) is the only local optimum and thus a global one.
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